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Abstract. This paper is concerned with cryptosystems offering perfect or un- 
conditional secrecy. For those perfect-secrecy s stems which involve using keys 
just once, the theory is well established; however, this is not the case for those 
systems which involve using a key several times. This paper takes a rigorous 
approach to the definition of such systems, and exhibits some new families of 
examples of systems providing perfect secrecy for which the number of keys is 
minimal. 
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1. Scope and Purpose 
Two of the main applications of cryptography are the provision of secrecy and/or 
authentication for messages. In 1949 Shannon [14] showed how to construct 
systems offering unconditional secrecy, i.e., theoretically perfect-secrecy systems, at 
the expense of the use of very large key spaces. Following this work on secrecy, 
Simmons [15] and others [3], [6] have considered systems which offer unconditional 
authentication, again at the expense of requiring very large numbers of keys. 
In fact, most practical security systems are not theoretically secure, and could be 
broken given unlimited computational resources. Such practical security systems 
are based on reasonable assumptions about he difficulty of certain computational 
problems, and have the advantage ofusing manageable numbers of keys. 
Nevertheless, unconditionally secure systems do find a use in certain special 
applications, e.g., the Washington-Moscow "Hot Line" [10]. It is also interesting 
to note that, although such "perfectly-secure" systems have been studied for nearly 
40 years, the theory is not fully developed, at least in the public domain. It is the 
purpose of this paper to contribute to the development of this theory. 
In particular, it attempts to classify a number of different definitions of perfect 
secrecy. Developing from this discussion of definitions, lower bounds are given for 
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the number of keys in such perfect systems, and theorems characterizing systems 
meeting these lower bounds ("key-minimal systems") are obtained. The last part of 
the paper is concerned with discussing examples of key-minimal systems providing 
unconditional secrecy. 
2. Notation 
In this section we develop the notation and list the assumptions used throughout 
this paper. We use the basic model for a security code developed by Simmons 1,15] 
and used by Brickell 1,3], De Soete I-4], 1,5], and Stinson [16], 1,17]. 
In this model there are three parties: the Transmitter, T, the Receiver, R, and an 
opponent, O. T wishes to send R one or more pieces of information in such a way 
that they cannot be read (secrecy) and/or modified/impersonated (authentication) 
by O. T and R achieve this by using a security code in conjunction with a secret, 
preagreed encoding rule from this security code; this encoding rule may be regarded 
as the cryptographic transformation corresponding to a secret key. It is always 
assumed that O knows the security code completely, the only secret is the encoding 
rule (i.e., the key) in use. 
More formally, a security code consists of three sets: a set S of source states, a set 
M of encoded messages, and a set E of encoding rules. Each encoding rule e is an 
injective function from S into M. Note that in the general case e may map a single 
element of S onto more than one message; this situation is usually called splittin# 
and we do not allow it here (note that splitting is implicitly ruled out by our 
assumption that each encoding rule is a function). We write k for ISl, v for IMI, and 
b for IEI throughout, and, following De Soete 1,4], [5], write SC(k, v, b) for a security 
code with k source states, vencoded messages, and b encoding rules. 
In this notation the set of source states corresponds to the set of different pieces 
on information T may wish to send to R. The set of encoded messages corresponds 
to what is actually transmitted and, perhaps, intercepted by O. The objective is to 
design the SC(k, v, b) so that the scheme protects T and R from O. 
We write pM(m), ps(S), and pE(e) for the a priori probabilities of occurrence 
of message m e M, source state s e S, and encoding rule e E E. We assume that 
encoding rules and source states are chosen independently, and hence 
Ps.E(s, e) = ps(s)" p~(e). 
We also assume that if two or more source states are to be encoded and sent using 
the same encoding rule, then the probabilities of occurrence of these source states 
are independent. 
Note that, since the probability of a message occurring is completely dependent 
on the associated probabilities for encoding rules and source states, we always have 
pM(m) = ~, ps(s)" pn(e), 
where ~.  denotes the sum over all pairs (s, e) of source states and encoding rules 
e such that e(s) = m. 
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We write pslu(slm), Puls(mls), PElu(elm), and PulE(role) for the conditional 
probabilities that source state s was intended if it is known that message m was 
sent, etc. 
So far we have considered the probabilities of occurrence of single source states, 
encoding rules, and messages. In fact, for the majority of this paper we are concerned 
with the situation where L distinct source states are to be communicated from T 
to R (using the same encoding rule), and hence L distinct messages are sent from 
T to R. In this context, ifS' is any L'-subset of S (L' < L), then we write ps(S' : L) for 
the probability that the intended set of L source states includes S'. The probability 
PM(M': L) is defined in a similar way (where M' is a subset of M of cardinality 
at most L). 
We drop the subscripts in our probability notation if it is clear what probability 
space is being used. We also drop the value L if it is clear how many source states 
are to be communicated. We abuse the notation slightly by writing ps(S) where s is 
an i-tuple of distinct source states, instead of something like ps~o(s : i) where S(i) 
denotes the set of all i-tuples of distinct source states. We also write p(s : i) where 
s is aj-tuple of distinct source states, j < i. By this we mean the probability that the 
source states in s are the first j of the i sent. In this context observe that 
p(s: i) = p(s :j), 
although a similar result would not be true if s was replaced by a j-subset of S. 
Minor abuses like these should be clear from the context, and have been done for 
the sake of clarity of exposition. 
The only restrictions we place on the probability distributions are as follows. We 
require that for every encoding rule e 
pE(e) > O, 
for every messagem 
and for every source state s 
pM(m) > O, 
ps(s) > O. 
This can easily be achieved by simply removing from the sets under consideration 
those source states, messages, and encoding rules with probability 0 of occurrence. 
If M' is some subset of M, i.e., M' is a set of encoded messages, then M' is said 
to be an allowable set if and only if there exists an encoding rule e and a subset S' 
of S such that 
e(S') = M'. 
In other words, M' is allowable iff M' could correspond to a set of messages 
encoded under a single encoding rule. An equivalent definition is as follows. M' is 
allowable iff 
PM(M') > O. 
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Note that this probabilistic definition is only equivalent to the original one under 
the above assumptions that all encoding rules and source states have nonzero 
probabilities of occurrence. Note also that, since every message is assumed to have 
a nonzero probability of occurrence, very singleton message set {m} is allowable. 
We denote the set of all allowable/-subsets of M by Xi. 
We define allowable tuples of messages in the same way. If m is an i-tuple of 
distinct encoded messages, then m is allowable if and only if there exists an encoding 
rule e and an i-tuple of distinct source states such that 
e(s) = m. 
Note that here, as throughout this paper, if 
S = (S l ,  S 2 . . . . .  Si) 
is an i-tuple of source states, then by e(s) we mean (e(sl), e(s2) . . . . .  e(si)). We denote 
the set of allowable i-tuples of distinct encoded messages by Y~. 
3. Definitions of "Perfect" Secrecy 
The initial problem that needs to be overcome in a formal study of cryptosystems 
providing unconditional or "perfect" secrecy is the fact that existing definitions 
vary. Therefore, before attempting to study such systems we review the existing 
definitions, and indicate the relationships between them. 
The first definition we give is a slightly modified version of a definition due to 
Stinson [16], [17]. 
Definition. Give L > 1, an SC(k, v, b) is said to provide Unordered Perfect L-fold 
secrecy (U(L)-secrecy) if, for every allowable L-subset M' of M and for every 
L-subset S' of S, 
pslM(S'IM' : L) = ps(S' : L). 
The second efinition we give is the unmodified form of Stinson's definition [16], 
[17]. 
Definition. Given L > 1, an SC(k, v, b) is said to provide Stinson Perfect L-fold 
secrecy (S(L)-secrecy) if,for every allowable L'-subset M' of M (L' < L) and for every 
L"-subset S' of S (L" < L'), 
psIM(S'IM' : L') = ps(S' : L'). 
Note that the requirement that M' be an allowable U-subset is not explicitly 
present in Stinson's definition [16], [17]. However, it is implicitly present, since 
otherwise pslM(S'IM':L') is undefined. 
The following result follows without difficulty from the above definitions: 
Lemma 3.1. An SC(k, v, b) provides S(L)-secrecy if and only if it provides U(L')- 
secrecy for every L' satisfying 1 <_ L' <_ L. 
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However, U(L)-secrecy by itself is not sufficient o guarantee S(L)-secrecy. For 
example, any SC(k, v, b) provides U(k)-secrecy, but will not necessarily provide 
S(k)-secrecy. Note that both these definitions are concerned with unordered sets of 
messages. A scheme providing S(L)-secrecy protects its users against he opponent 
O gaining any information about the content of a set of L intercepted messages. 
However, such a scheme will not necessarily prevent O gaining information about 
the possible orderings of source states corresponding to observed messages. To 
provide this stronger notion of secrecy requires the use of a scheme satisfying our 
third definition, as follows: 
Definition. Given L _> l, an SC(k, v, b) is said to provide Ordered Perfect L-fold 
secrecy (O(L)-secrecy) if, for every allowable L-tuple m of distinct messages from M 
and for every L-tuple s of distinct source states from S, 
PsiM(Slm : L) = ps(S : L). 
It is then straightforward to establish: 
Lemma 3.2. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides O(L)-secrecy, then it also provides O(L')- 
secrecy for every L' satisfying 1 < L' < L. 
Proof. Suppose s is an (L - 1)-tuple of distinct source states, and suppose m is 
an allowable (L - 1)-tuple of distinct messages. In addition let X(s) be the set of 
L-tuples of distinct source states which "agree" with s in the first (L - 1) positions. 
Similarly, let X(m) be the set of allowable L-tuples of distinct messages which 
"agree" with m in the first (L - 1) positions. Then 
PslM(Slm" L -- 1) 
= ~ PslM(S'I m 
s' e X(s) 
= Z 
s' ~ X(s) 
= 
s' e X(s) 
= Z 
s' ~ X(s) 
= Z 
s' ~ X(s) 
(by O(L)-secrecy) 
= ~ ps(s':L) 
s' E X(s) 
= Ps(S : L - 1). 
The result hen follows. 
"L) 
PMls(mls' : L)" ps(s' " L ) /pM(m " L) 
[] 
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We also have: 
Lemma 3.3. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides O(L)-secrecy, then it also provides S(L)- 
secrecy. 
Proof. Suppose M* is any element ofX  i and S* is any j-set of source states, where 
j < i < L. Let TL(M*) denote the subset of YL consisting of those L-tuples containing 
all the elements of M*. Similarly, let TL(S*) denote the set of L-tuples of distinct 
source states which contain all elements of S*. Then 
PslM(S*IM*) = ~' , PSlM(SIM*) 
se  TL(S ) 
= ~,  (l/D) ~ pM(m)'PslM(Slm) 
TL(S ) M* s~ m~ L( ) 
(where D = me TL(M~ * PM(m))) 
= ~ (l/D) ~ pM(m)'ps(S) 
se  S* L( ) L( ) m ~ M* 
= ~s*  ps(S) 
s L( ) 
= ps(S*). 
The result hen follows. 
(by O(L)-secrecy) 
[] 
It is straightforward to see why the converse is not true; consider the following 
example: 
Example. Let E = {eo, el, e2}, S = {So, Sl, S2}, M = {m o, ml, m2}, and suppose 
ei(si) = ink, where k = i + j (mod 3). Suppose also that p(ei) = 89 for every i. 
This example provides S(2)-secrecy and U(2)-secrecy. However, it only provides 
O(1)-secrecy and not O(2)-secrecy. 
Before proceeding to our fourth (and final) definition it is important to note that 
all the above definitions relate to "ciphertext-only" attacks. Essentially, they are all 
concerned with the situation where the opponent O has intercepted L encoded 
messages and wishes to deduce information about he corresponding set of L source 
states. We now consider a definition of perfect security (due to Massey [10]) based 
on the concept of a "known-plaintext" attack. 
Massey defines a known-plaintext a tack of order i to be an attack where the 
opponent Ohas intercepted i valid and distinct plaintext/ciphertext pairs (i.e., source 
state/encoded message pairs) all encrypted using the same encoding rule, e say. O 
is also assumed to have a further encoded message, m say, produced using e and 
distinct from the messages in the i pairs, for which he wishes to obtain information 
about the corresponding source state. Then the attack will be said to "succeed" if
there exists some source state s, distinct from the states in the i pairs, such that the 
probability that s corresponds to m given the knowledge of the i pairs is different 
from the a priori probability of s (given that it is known that it differs from the source 
states contained in the i pairs). 
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Definition. An SC(k, v, b) is said to provide Massey Perfect L-fold secrecy (M(L)- 
secrecy) if, for any i < L, the scheme is secure against an order i known-plaintext 
attack. 
Note that the above definition is intended to be precisely the same as Massey's 
except hat what we call M(L)-secrecy is what Massey calls Perfect (L - 1)-fold 
secrecy. We have modified the definition so that it corresponds more closely with 
the other definitions given here. An equivalent definition of M(L)-secrecy, and one 
that fits more naturally with the other definitions, is as follows: 
Definition. Consider any SC(k, v, b). Let s be any i-tuple of distinct source states 
and let s' be the unique (i - 1)-tuple derived from s by deleting its last entry. Let m 
be any allowable i-tuple of distinct messages with the property that there exists an 
encoding rule e and an i-tuple of distinct source states s* with e(s*)= m and 
s* agreeing with s in all the first i -  1 positions. Then, the SC(k, v, b) provides 
M(L)-secrecy if and only if, for every i < L and for every s, s', m as above, 
p(slm, s': i) = p(sls' : i). 
Note that, by definition, M(L)-secrecy implies M(L')-secrecy for every L' < L. It 
is perhaps urprising to discover that Massey's definition is no stronger than the 
previous one. In fact we have: 
Theorem 3.4. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides O(L)-secrecy, then it also provides M(L)- 
secrecy. 
Proof. Suppose i < L and that m, s, s' are as in the definition immediately above; 
in addition let X(s') denote the set of all i-tuples of distinct elements of S which 
agree with s' in the first i - 1 positions. Moreover, suppose that the system provides 
O(L)-secrecy and hence O(i)-secrecy (by Lemma 3.2). Then 
p(slm, s': i) = p(s, m, s':i)/p(s', m :i) 
= p(s, m : i)/p(s', m : i) 
= p(slm:i) 'p(m:i)/p(s' lm:i).p(m:i) 
= p(s : i)/p(s'lm: i) (by O(i)-secrecy). 
Now 
Hence 
p(s ' lm: i )= ~ p(tlm:i) 
t 9 X(s ' )  
= ~ p(t:i) 
t ~ X(s ' )  
= p(s' : i). 
(by O(i)-secrecy) 
p(slm, s': i) = p(s:i)/p(s': i) 
= p(s ts '  : i). [] 
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It is also rather surprising to discover that the converse to Theorem 3.4 is not 
true. Consider the following example: 
Example. Let E = {eo, el, e2}, S = {s o, sl}, M = {m o, ml, m2}, and suppose 
ei(sj) = ink, where k = i + j (mod 3). Moreover, suppose that p(ei) = 89 for every i, 
Then it is straightforward to see that this example gives O(1)-secrecy, M(2)-secrecy, 
S(2)-secrecy, and U(2)-secrecy, but does not give O(2)-secrecy. Note also that the 
example following Lemma 3.3 provides S(2)-secrecy and U(2)-secrecy but only 
M(1)-secrecy and O(1)-secrecy. 
From now on, although it is a little more powerful, we use the definition of 
O(L)-secrecy rather than that of M(L)-secrecy, since it appears to be easier to 
handle. Before proceeding note also that, for L = 1, all the above definitions 
coincide and in fact equate to Shannon's notion of perfect secrecy [14]. 
4. Bounds for L-Secrecy Systems 
We now consider avariety of bounds which can be established for L-secrecy systems 
of various types. We start by considering the weakest form of L-secrecy, namely 
U(L)-secrecy. 
Lemma 4.1. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides U(L)-secrecy, then for every allowable L-set 
of messages M' and for every L-set of source states S' there exists an encoding rule 
e such that 
e(S') = M'. 
Proof. 
such that there is no encoding rule which maps S' onto M'. Then, clearly 
psIM(S'IM' ) = O, 
which contradicts the assumption of U(L)-secrecy since 
ps(S') > O. 
Suppose not, i.e., suppose there exists a pair of L-sets M', S' (M' allowable) 
[] 
It is also straightforward to show: 
Lemma 4.2. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides U(L)-secrecy, then 
b>_lXLI, 
where, as before, X L is the set of allowable L-subsets of M. Moreover, if 
b = IXLI, 
then: 
(i) I f  S* is any L-subset of S and M* is any element of X t, there exists a unique 
encoding rule e such that 
e(S*) = M*. 
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(ii) For every encoding rule e, if M* is any element of XL which is also a subset of 
e(S), then 
pr(e) = PM(M*). 
Proof. Let S* be any L-subset of S. Then, by Lemma 4.1, if M* is any allowable 
L-subset of M, there exists an encoding rule e with 
e(S*) = M* .  
Therefore, if we fix S* and let M* range over all elements of XL, we obtain a set of 
I XL[ different encoding rules. The bound follows. 
Now suppose b = IXL[. Following the above argument, it is clear that fixing S* 
and letting M* range over all the elements of XL exhausts the set of encoding rules. 
Statement (i) then follows immediately. 
To establish (ii) suppose S* is any L-set of source states and let M* be any 
element of X L. In addition let e be the unique encoding rule which maps S* onto 
M*. Then 
PSIM(S*IM*) = PEIM(elM*) 
= pul~(M*le), pe(e)/pu(M*) 
= Ps(S*)'p~(e)/Pu(M*). 
But, by the definition of U(L)-secrecy, 
Hence 
and (ii) follows immediately. 
PsI~(S*IM*) = ps(S*). 
pc(e) = pM(M*) 
[] 
Using these lemmas we can now establish the following theorem, the bound of 
which was previously obtained in the two eases of greatest interest by De Soete [4], 
and a special case of which is also given by Stinson [18, Theorem 2.1]. 
Theorem 4.3. 
Moreover, if 
I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides U(L)-secrecy, then 
then: 
(i) I f  L > 1, for any pair of encoding rules el, e2 either 
el(S ) = e2(S )
or el(S) and e2(S ) are disjoint. 
10 
(ii) If e 1 and e 2 are encoding rules satisfying 
el(S) = e2(S), 
then 
Pr,(ea) = PE(e2) = pM(M*) 
for every M* in XL which is also a subset of el(S). 
Proof. 
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By Lemma 4.2, to establish the bound we need only show that 
'Xt., > - (v/k)'(kL). 
Choose any message m; then, since we assume throughout that pM(m) > 0, there 
exists a source state s and an encoding rule e with 
e(s) = m. 
Now, it is clear that 
le(S)l = k, 
and hence there are at least allowable L-subsets of M which include m. 
Since there are precisely v ch~ f~ m this gives us a t~ ~ v ' (k  - ll) 
necessarily distinct) allowable L-subsets of M. Each such allowable L-subset cannot 
have been counted more than L times, giving us 
The bound follows. 
Now suppose that 
and hence 
xL,  )jL 
Suppose also that L > 1. We know that each message m is included in at least 
(kL--11) allowableL-sets;hence, sincethereareonly(v/L)'(kL-11)allowable 
L-setsintotal, eachmessagemiscontainedinprecisely(kL--11) aUowableL-sets. 
Now, if e is any encoding rule for which m ~ e(S), then since [e(S)l = k, e itself will 
immediately ield allowable L-sets containing m. Hence, if e' is any 
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other encoding rule for which m ~ e'(S), then e(S) = e'(S), since there are no more 
allowable L-sets containing m. Note that the above argument is only valid if L > 1. 
The above applies for all messages mand (i) follows. 
Statement (ii) is immediate on application of Lemma 4.2(ii). [] 
We consider examples of schemes possessing U(L)-secrecy in Section 5 below. 
Note that, because S(L)-secrecy implies U(L)-secrecy, the results of Theorem 4.3 
also apply to S(L)-secrecy systems. Before proceeding observe that Theorem 4.30) 
does not hold for the case L = 1. Counterexamples are provided by any latin 
rectangle scheme (see Section 5 below). 
If we now consider O(L)-secrecy, then we get a similar set of results as follows: 
Lemma 4.4. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides O(L)-secrecy and t satisfies 1 <_ t <_ L, then 
for every allowable t-tuple of distinct messages m and for every t-tuple of distinct 
source states s there exists an encoding rule e such that 
e(s) = m. 
Proof .  
such that there is no encoding rule which maps s onto m. Then, clearly 
Pslu(slm) = 0, 
which, by Lemma 3.2 contradicts the assumption of O(L)-secrecy since 
Ps(S) > O. 
It is also straightforward to show: 
Suppose not, i.e., suppose there exists a pair of t-tuples m, s (m allowable) 
[] 
Lemma 4.5. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides O(L)-secrecy, then 
b >--IYLI, 
where, as before, YL is the set of allowable L-tuples of distinct elements of M. 
Moreover, if 
b= IYLP, 
then: 
(i) I f  s is any L-tuple of distinct elements of S and m is any element of YL, there 
exists a unique encoding rule e such that 
e(s) = m. 
(ii) For every encoding rule e, if m is any element of Y~. for which the elements of 
m are all contained in e(S), then 
pe(e) = pu(m). 
Proof. Let s be any L-tuple of distinct elements of S. Then, by Lemma 4.4, if m is 
any element of YL, there exists an encoding rule e with 
e(s) = m.  
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Therefore, if we fix s and let m range over all elements of YL, we obtain a set of I YLI 
different encoding rules. The bound follows. 
Now suppose b = I YLI" Following the above argument, it is clear that fixing s and 
letting m range over all the elements of YL exhausts the set of encoding rules. 
Statement (i) then follows immediately. 
To establish (ii) suppose s is any L-tuple of distinct source states and let e be the 
unique encoding rule which maps s onto m. Then 
PslM(Slm) = pEiM(elm) 
= Pmle(mle)" p+(e)/pu(m) 
= Ps(S)'pn(e)/pM(m ). 
But, by the definition of O(L)-secrecy, 
PS.M(Slm) = ps(S). 
Hence 
pc(e) = pu(m). 
Statement (ii) follows immediately. [] 
Using these lemmas we can now establish the following result. Note that the 
bound in this theorem was previously established for M(L)-secret systems by 
Massey [10, equation (5)]. 
Theorem 4.6. I f  an SC(k, v, b) provides O(L)-secrecy, then 
b >_ v. (k - 1)[/(k - L)!. 
Moreover, if 
b = v. (k - 1)[/(k - L)I, 
then: 
(i) I f  L > 1, for any pair of encoding rules el, e2 either 
el(S ) = e2(S )
or el(S ) and e2(S ) are disjoint. 
(ii) I f  e I and e2 are encoding rules satisfying 
el(S) = e2(S), 
then 
p~(el) = Pe(e2) = pM(m) 
for every m in YL for which all elements in m are in el(S ). 
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, to establish the bound we need only show that 
I YLI > v ' (k -  1) l / (k -  L)!. 
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Choose any message m; then, since pu(m)  > 0, there exists a source state s and 
an encoding rule e with 
Now, it is clear that 
e(s) = m. 
le(S)[--- k, 
and hence there are at least (k - 1)!/(k - L ) !  allowable L-tuples of distinct elements 
of M which have m as their first entry. Since there are precisely vchoices for m this 
gives us 
IYLI > v . (k  - 1)!/(k - g)! 
and the bound follows. 
Now suppose that 
and hence 
b = v ' (k  - 1)!/(k - L)!, 
(b =) I YLI = v .  (k - 1)!/(k - L)!. 
We know that each message m is included as the first element in at least 
(k - 1)!/(k - L)! allowable L-tuples; hence, since there are only v. (k - 1)!/(k - L)! 
allowable L-tuples in total, each message m is contained as the first element in 
precisely (k - 1)!/(k - L)! allowable L-tuples. 
Suppose also that L > 1. Now, if e is any encoding rule for which m ~ e(S),  then 
since le(S)l = k, e itself will immediately yield (k - 1)!/(k - L)! allowable L-tuples 
with first element m. Hence, i f e '  is any other encoding rule for which m ~ e ' (S) ,  then 
e(S)  = e ' (S) ,  since there are no more allowable L-tuples with m as the first element. 
Note that the above argument is only valid if L > 1. This argument applies for all 
messages mand (i) follows. 
Statement (ii) follows immediately from Lemma 4.5(ii). [] 
We consider examples of O(L)-secret systems in Section 5 below. Before proceeding 
observe that Theorem 4.6(i) does not hold for the case L = 1. Counterexamples are 
provided by any latin rectangle scheme (see Section 5 below). 
5. Examples of L-Secrecy Systems 
We now consider some examples of L-secrecy systems for which the numbers of 
encoding rules meet he lower bounds established in Section 4 above. It is of interest 
to construct such systems ince, for any security system, it is always desirable to 
minimize the number of encoding rules and hence the key size. We divide our 
examples into two categories; namely, those satisfying the bounds of Theorems 4.3 
and 4.6, respectively. 
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5.1. Systems Providing U(L)-Secrecy and S(L)-Secrecy 
If we examine the bound of Theorem 4.3, it appears reasonable first to examine the 
case where v = k, and hence 
since this minimizes the number of encoding rules for a given number of source 
states. Indeed, if no authentication is required, then there seems no reason to choose 
v any larger than absolutely necessary. 
In this case we may identify S with M, and each encoding rule is then no more 
than a permutation on M. Moreover, by Theorem 4.3(ii), each encoding rule must 
be equiprobable. These constraints now enable us to give a purely combinatorial 
/ IN  
necessary and sufficient condition for a set o f (L  ) permutations onM to form 
\ / 
a system providing U(L)-secrecy. Before proceeding note also that in this case Xi 
consists of all/-subsets of M, i.e., all i-subsets of M are allowable. 
Theorem 5.1. Suppose E is a set of encoding rules (permutations) for an 
SC(k,k , (kL)) ,whereM=S. ThenthisschemeprovidesU(L)-secrecyifandonlyif: 
(i) pe(e)= 1/(L)foreveryencodingrule e. 
i x. / 
(ii) For every pair of L-subsets M*, S* of M, there exists a unique encoding rule 
e with 
e(S*) = M*. 
Proof. Suppose the scheme provides U(L)-secrecy. Then (i) holds by Theorem 
4.3(ii). Moreover, (ii) holds by Lemma 4.2(i). 
Now suppose (i) and (ii) hold and suppose S* is an L-subset of S and M* is 
an L-subset of M (and hence allowable). Then 
p(S*IM*) = p(M*iS*)" p(S*)/p(M*) 
= p(e).p(S*)/p(M*) 
(where e is the unique encoding rule mapping S* to M*) 
: , (S ' ) / ( (k ) . , ( , ' ) )  (by (i)). 
J ~ ~ ~ 
But, by definition, 
ptM*) = ~ p(S'), pte) 
(e ,S ' ) :  e(S ' )=M* 
(e ,S ' ) :  e(S ' )=M 
= 1/(kL) (by (ii)). 
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Hence, as required, 
and the result follows. 
p(S*IM*) = p(S*) 
[] 
Note that, for the case L = 1, the above theorem was first obtained by Shannon 
(p. 681 of I-14-1). In the situation where the theorem holds we also have the following 
result: 
Theorem 5.2. Suppose E is a set of encoding rules (permutations) for an 
/ / ~ \ \  
SC(k, k, ( L ) )wh ich  provides U(L)-secrecy, and where M=S.  Then, for every 
\ \ l l  
L' < L, the scheme also provides U(L')-secrecy if and only if, for every pair of 
L'-subsets M', S' of M, there exist precisely w' encodin# rules e with 
where 
e(S') = M', 
w 
L L' " 
Proof. First, if M' and S' are any L'-subsets of M, then let E(S', M') denote the 
set of encoding rules which map S' onto M'. By definition, the scheme provides 
U(L')-secrecy 
This holds 
if and only if p(S'I M') = p(S'). 
if and only if p(M'IS') = p(M'), 
if and only if ~ p(e) = p(M'), 
eeg(S ' ,M ' )  
only if IE(S', M ' ) , / (k )=p(M' ) .  (*) if and 
First suppose that (.) holds. Now, if we fix M' and let S' range over all (Lk,) possible 
L'-subsets of M, then the sets E(S', M') will be pairwise disjoint and have the 
property that their union is E. Moreover, since the right-hand side of (.) will be 
fixed, they must all have the same size. Hence 
/(;) ) IEtS',M')I = IEI ' = L L' 
as required. 
Now suppose that (**) holds for all M' and S'. By definition, 
p(M') = ~ ~, p(S')" p(e) 
S' e~E(S ' ,M ' )  
(**) 
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:r,,s,/(;) 
Equation (,) follows immediately. 
(by **) 
[] 
Before considering actual examples we explore in a little more detail sets of 
permutations satisfying condition (ii) of Theorem 5.1. We make the following 
definition. 
Definition. Suppose E is a set of permutations on the set S, where IEI : b and 
I Sl = k. Then E is said to be (t, w)-homogeneous on S if and only if, for every pair of 
t-subsets of S ($1, $2 say), there exist precisely w permutations e in E such that 
e(S1)=S2.  
By Theorem 5.1, the study of U(L)-secret systems having 
is then precisely equivalent to the study of(L, 1)-homogeneous sets of permutations 
on a set of size k. Moreover, by Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 3.1, the study of S(L)- 
secret systems having 
is precisely equivalent to the study of(L, 1)-homogeneous sets of permutations on a 
seto fs i zekwhichhavetheproper ty that theyarea lso( i , (kL ) / (k i ) ) -homogeneous  
for every i satisfying 1 _< i __N L. 
The following results hold for homogeneous sets of permutations. Note first that 
Lemmas 5.3 and 5.7 below have been independently derived by Kramer et al. 
[7, Theorem 1.1]. These results were also previously given by Nomura [12] for 
the case w = 1. 
Lemma 5.3. I f  E is (t, w)-homogeneous on S, then E is also (k - t, w)-homogeneous 
on S. 
Proof. Suppose E is (t, w)-homogeneous on S, and in addition suppose that S 1 and 
$2 are (k - 0-subsets of S. Then it should be clear that if 
C(S,) = S - S, ( /= 1, 2), 
then encoding rule e satisfies 
e(S1) = e(Sg) 
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if and only if 
e(C(S,)) = e(C(S2)). 
Since [C(SI)I = [C($2)1 = t the result follows. []  
Lemma 5.4. I f  E is (t, w)-homogeneous on S, then 
Proof. Let S 1 be any fixed t-subset of S. Then for any t-subset of S ($2 say) there 
existprecisely wpermutationsin Emapping S1 onto $2. Since there are (kt) such 
subsets $2, and since each element of E must map S~ onto some such t-subset, the 
result follows. []  
Lemma 5.5 (Mowbray). I f  E is (t, w)-homogeneous on S, where 1 < t < (k + 1)/2, 
then E is also (t', w')-homogeneous on S for every t' < t, where 
W'=W" 
t t' 
Proof. Suppose E is (t, w)-homogeneous on S. If X, Y are (t - 1)-subsets of S and 
0 _< s < t - 1, then let N(X, Y, s) denote the number of permutations e such that 
e(X) and Y have precisely s elements in common. We now show (by induction on s) 
that (given 1 < t _< (k + 1)/2) N(X, Y, s) is independent of the choice of X and Y. 
This immediately ields the desired result (by setting s = t - 1). 
First suppose s = 0. If e is such that e(X) and Y are disjoint, then there exist 
precisely (k - 2(t - 1)) choices for a t-set X'  where X'  contains X and e(X') is 
disjoint from Y. That is, there are exactly (k - 2(t - 1)).N(X, Y, 0) pairs (e, X'), 
where IX'l = t, g '  contains X, and e(X') and Y are disjoint. But, since E is (t, w)- 
homogeneous, there are also (k - ( t -  1 ) ) ' (  k - ( t -  / 1) ) .w \ such pairs. Hence the 
\ t ,/ 
claim is true for s = 0 and we have 
n(x,  Y, o)= w. (  k - ( t -  t _ 1))/(k- 2 ( t -  1)), 
k t 7 
where k - 2(t - 1) > 0, since t < (k + 1)/2. 
Now suppose s > 0 and suppose also that the inductive hypothesis is true for all 
s' (0 < s' < s). First suppose e is such that e(X) and Y have precisely s elements in 
common; then there exist precisely (k - 2(t - 1) + s) choices for a t-set X'  where X'  
contains X and e(X') and Y meet in precisely s elements. Second suppose e is 
such that e(X) and Y have precisely s - 1 elements in common; then there exist 
precisely (t - s) choices for a t-set X'  where X'  contains X and e(X') and Y meet 
in precisely s elements. That is, there are exactly (k - 2(t - 1) + s)" N(X, Y, s) + 
(t - s)" N(X, Y, s - 1) pairs (e, X'), where IX'l = t, X'  contains X, and e(X') and Y 
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meet in precisely s elements of S. But, since E is (t, w)-homogeneous, there are also 
(k - (t -1 ) ) ' (k  - (t -1 ) ) ' ( t  -1 )  - s s The resultfollows. [] 
The last result, when taken in conjunction with Theorem 5.2 and Lemma 5.3, 
implies the following: 
((k)) Corollary 5.6. I f  an SC k, k, L provides U(L)-secrecy and 1 < L < (k + 1)/2, 
then it also provides U(L')-secrecy for every L' satisfying either 1 < L' < L or 
k -L  <L '  <k.  
['xk 
The problem remains of constructing sets of permutations of cardinality ~L)  with 
x / 
the desired property for Theorem 4.3, i.e., constructing (L, 1)-homogeneous sets of 
permutations. We first note the following result giving a necessary condition for the 
existence of an (L, 1)-homogeneous set. 
Lemma 5.7. I f  E is (t, 1)-homogeneous on the k-set S (1 < t < (k + 1)/2), then 
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5.5. [] 
We now consider examples of U(L)-secure systems which satisfy 
For the case L = 1, as observed by Shannon [14], the existence of such a set is 
precisely equivalent to the existence of a latin square of order k. We now describe 
the precise quivalence. 
A latin square of order k is merely a k by k matrix all of whose entries are taken 
from the set { 1, 2, .. . ,  k} with the property that the entries in any row are all distinct 
and the entries in any column are all distinct. Each row (and each column) will 
therefore contain a permutation ofthe numbers 1to k. If row i contains the entries 
rl, r 2 . . . . .  rk, then define the permutation Pi by 
Pi(J) = rj. 
It is then clear that the k permutations Pl, P2, ..., Pk will form a (1, 1)-homogeneous 
set on {1, 2 . . . . .  k}. Moreover, any (1, 1)-homogeneous set can be used to derive 
a latin square. It should also be clear that the one-time pad cipher (see, for example, 
Chapter 3 of Beker and Piper [1]) is equivalent to a latin square. It is easy to 
construct latin squares of any desired size (e.g., by letting the first row be any 
permutation and letting the subsequent rows be defined as all cyclic shifts of the 
first row), and hence (1, 1)-homogeneous sets exist for all values of k. 
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Finally, note that, since U(1)-secrecy, S(1)-secrecy, O(1)-secrecy, and M(1)-secrecy 
are all equivalent, latin squares are also in precise correspondence to key-minimal 
examples of these other types of perfect-secrecy schemes. 
For the case L = 2, we assert that the existence of a (2, 1)-homogeneous set of 
permutations i  equivalent to the existence of a Perpendicular Array with parameters 
PA(k, k). We now justify this claim. 
Following Mullin et al. [11], a Perpendicular Array (PA) of order n and depth s 
(writtenPA(n,s))isansby(~)array 
X = (x~j) 
withentriesfromasetMonnelementssuchthat, foranytworowsofX, the(~) 
columns contain all (~)  unordered pairs of distinct elements of M. The following 
result, attributed by Mullin et al. [11] to E. Mendelsohn, is straightforward to 
establish: 
Lemma 5.8. In any PA(n, s) with s > 2, each element of M occurs (n - 1)/2 times 
in each row of X (and hence n is odd). 
Now, i fs=n, i .e. ,whenwehaveaPA(n,n) , thenXisannby(~)array,  andit 
is straightforward to see that each column of X is a permutation of the elements of 
f (n )  permutations which M. Just as with the latin squares we thereby derive a set o 2 
forms a (2, 1)-homogeneous set on M, where IMI - n. Conversely, given any (2, 1)- 
homogeneous set of permutations on a set of size k, we may immediately derive 
a PA(k, k). 
It is well known (see Corollary 2.5 of Mullin et al. [11]) that if 
n = pa (a > 1, p an odd prime), 
then there exists a PA(n, n). Hence key-minimal U(2)-secret systems can be con- 
structed whenever k is a power of an odd prime. It appears that no PA(n, n), and 
hence no key-minimal U(2)-secret code, is known for any other values of n. 
Finally, note that, given the above correspondence, forthe case n = s Mendelsohn's 
Lemma 5.8 above is merely a special case of Lemma 5.5 (where w = 1 and t = 2). 
In addition, by the same lemma, any (2, 1)-homogeneous set is also (1, (k - 1)/2)- 
homogeneous, and hence, by Theorem 5.2, the existence of an S(2)-secret system 
with 
is also equivalent to the existence of a PA(k, k). 
(t, 1)-homogeneous sets of permutations have been previously studied by Nomura 
[12]. Recently, many (t, w)-homogeneous sets of permutations for t > 3 have been 
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discovered [7], [8], [19]. Before proceeding it is also interesting to note that as long 
ago as 1961, Rag [13] defined an Orthooonal Array of Type II of strength d, s 
constraints, order n, and index h, (N, s, n, d) : II to be an s by N array of elements of 
ann-setMsuchthat, inanysetofdrows, theNcolumnscontaineachofthe(~) 
d-subsetsofMexactlyhtimes(andhenceN= h" (~) ) .  It is then straightforward 
to see that a (t, w)-homogeneous set of permutations on a set of size k is precisely 
equivalent to a (w'(kt), k, k, t)" II, i.e., an orthogonal array of type lI with k con- 
straints. Rag [13, Theorem 2] went on to show the existence of(s(s - 1)/2, s, s, 2) : II 
whenever s is an odd prime power. This corresponds exactly to the known values 
of n for which there exists a PA(n, n) (see above). 
To conclude this discussion of U(L)-secret and S(L)-secret systems, we now relax 
our requirement that v = k, and consider schemes for which 
b=(v/k).(kL) and v>k.  
We first consider the (special) case L = 1. In this case the above equation reduces 
to b = v. Using Lemma 4.2 it is then straightforward to see that the existence of 
such a set of encoding rules is precisely equivalent to the existence of a k by v latin 
rectangle, where a latin rectangle is merely a k by v matrix, all of whose entries are 
taken from the set { 1, 2, . . . ,  v} with the property that the entries in any row/column 
are all distinct (hence k < v). The equivalence is the same as that described above 
for latin squares in the case L = 1 and v = k. 
I fL > 1, then, by Theorem 4.3(i), v = kt for some integer t, and the message space 
can be partitioned into t subsets of size k, say M1, M2 . . . . .  Mr, such that, for any 
encoding rule e, 
e(S) = M i 
for some i. Therefore let E i denote the set of encoding rules mapping S onto Mi and 
then El, E2, ..., E, will form a partition of E. Moreover, by Theorem 4.3(ii), if 
el(S) = e2(S), 
then 
p(el) = P(e2) , 
and hence let p~ denote the probability p(e) for any e in E v It is then straightforward 
to establish that each triple (S, M~, E~) forms an (L, 1)-homogeneous set of permuta- 
tions. This means that the study of U(L)-secrecy schemes with 
b=(v/k).(kL) and v>k 
is contained within the study of such schemes with v = k, and therefore we do not 
consider them further. 
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5.2 Systems Providing O(L)-Secrecy and M(L)-Secrecy 
If we examine the bound of Theorem 4.6, then, as in Section 5.1, it appears 
reasonable first to examine the case where v -- k, and hence b = kl/(k - L)! since 
this minimizes the number of encoding rules for a given number of source states. 
In this case we may identify S with M, and each encoding rule is then no more 
than a permutation on M. Moreover, by Theorem 4.6(ii), each encoding rule must 
be equiprobable. These constraints now enable us to give a purely combinatorial 
/ T X  
necessary and sufficient condition for a set o f (L  ) permutations on M to form 
x / 
a system providing O(L)-secrecy. 
Theorem 5.9. Suppose E is a set of encoding rules (permutations) for an 
SC(k, k, kl/(k - L)!), where M = S. Then this scheme provides O(L)-secrecy if and 
only if: 
(i) pr.(e) = (k - L)!/k! for every encoding rule e. 
(ii) For every pair of L-tuples of distinct elements m, s of M, there exists a unique 
encoding rule e with 
e(s) = m. 
Proof. Suppose the scheme provides O(L)-secrecy. Then (i) holds by Theorem 
4.6(ii). Moreover, (ii) holds by Lemma 4.5(i). 
Now suppose (i) and (ii) hold and suppose s is an L-tuple of distinct elements of 
S and m is an allowable L-tuple of distinct elements of M. Then 
p(slm) = p(mls)'p(s)/p(m) 
= p(e)'p(s)/p(m) 
(where e is the unique encoding rule mapping s to m) 
= p(s)-(k - L)!/(k!. p(m)) (by (i)). 
But, by definition, 
Hence, as required, 
and the result follows. 
p(m) = ~. p(s')'p(e) 
(e, s') : e(s') = m 
= p(s ' ) . (k  - L)!/k! 
(e, s') : e(s')= in 
= (k - L)!/k! (by (ii)). 
p(slm) = p(s) 
[] 
Note that, for the case L = 1, the above theorem coincides with Theorem 5.1, 
which, for the L = 1 case, was first obtained by Shannon (p. 681 of 1-14]). In the 
situation where the theorem holds we also have the following result: 
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Theorem 5.10. Suppose E is a set of  encoding rules (permutations) for an 
SC(k, k, k!/(k - L)!) which provides O(L)-secrecy, and where M = S. Then, for every 
L' < L, there exist precisely w' encoding rules e with 
e(s) = m, 
where 
w' = (k - L')!/(k - L)!. 
Proof. First observe that, by Lemma 3.2, any scheme providing O(L)-secrecy must 
also provide O(L')-secrecy for every L' < L. Suppose m and s are any L'-tuples of 
distinct elements of M and let E(s, m) denote the set of encoding rules which map 
s onto m. By definition, since the scheme provides O(L')-secrecy: 
Hence: 
p(slm) = p(s). 
p(m) = p(mls) 
= ~, p(e) 
e ~ E(s, m) 
= IE(s, m)l'(k - L)[/k!. (,) 
Now, if we fix m and let s range over all k!/(k - L')! possible L'-tuples of distinct 
elements of M, then the sets E(s, m) will be pairwise disjoint and have the property 
that their union is E. Moreover, since the left-hand side of (.) will be fixed, they 
must all have the same size. Hence 
IE(s, m)l = IEI .(k - L')!/k! = (k - Z')! /(k - L)! 
as required. [] 
Before considering actual examples we explore in a little more detail sets of 
permutations satisfying condition (ii) of Theorem 5.9. We make the following 
definition. 
Definition. Suppose E is a set of permutations on the set S, where [El = b and 
ISI = k. Then E is said to be (t, w)-transitive on S if and only if, for every pair of 
t-tuples of distinct elements of S (sl, s2 say), there exist precisely w permutations 
e in E such that 
e(sl) = s2. 
By Theorem 5.9, the study of O(L)-secret systems having b = k!/(k - L)! is then 
precisely equivalent to the study of (L, 1)-transitive sets of permutations on a set of 
size k. Moreover, by Theorem 5.10, every (L, 1)-transitive set of permutations is also 
(i, (k - i)!/(k - L)!)-transitive for every i satisfying 1< i < L. 
The problem remains of constructing sets of permutations of cardinality 
k!/(k - L)! with the desired property for Theorem 5.9, i.e., constructing (L, 1)- 
transitive sets of permutations. 
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The case L = 1 has already been studied in Section 5.1 above. 
For the case L > 2, the theory of finite groups provides a number of examples. 
Suppose E is a set of permutations on k elements. If E forms a subgroup of S k, then 
E is a (t, w)-transitive set of permutations if and only if it is a t-transitive group. 
Moreover, using the language of group theory, it is a (t, 1)-transitive set if and only 
if it is a sharply t-transitive group. For a discussion of t-fold transitivity in finite 
permutation groups, see, for example, [20]. 
Two "trivial" families of group-based examples are provided by the symmetric 
group Sk and the alternating roup Ak. As Massey [10] has noted, Sk is sharply 
k-transitive and hence provides an example (in fact the only example) of a key- 
minimal system providing O(k)- and M(k)-secrecy. In addition, Ak is sharply (k - 2)- 
transitive, and hence provides an example of a key-minimal system providing 
O(k - 2)- and M(k - 2)-secrecy. 
Sharply 2- and 3-transitive groups are known to exist for infinitely many values 
of k. However, the situation is very different for t > 4. Apart from Sk and Ak, the 
only t-transitive groups with t > 4 are the Mathieu groups: Ml l ,  M12, M2a, and 
M24, where Mi acts on a set of i elements; for details of the theory of the Mathieu 
groups, see, for example, Chapter 20 of [9]. Groups Mll  and M23 are 4-transitive 
and M12 and M24 are 5-transitive; Mt I and M~2 are sharply 4- and 5-transitive, 
whereas M23 and M24 are not. Hence Mlt  and Mr2 (of orders 7920 and 95040, 
respectively) are the only "nontrivial" examples of sharply t-transitive groups for 
t_>4. 
To obtain further examples of(t, 1)-transitive sets it is therefore necessary to look 
for examples where the set of permutations does not form a group. The construction 
of such sets (often called sharply t-transitive permutation sets) has been the subject 
of research for some time (see, for example, [2]), and there are many examples 
known of (t, 1)-transitive sets which are not subgroups (or cosets of subgroups) 
of S~. 
To conclude this discussion of O(L)-secret systems, we now relax our requirement 
that v = k, and consider schemes for which 
b=(v /k ) .k ! / (k -L ) !  and v>k.  
The case L = 1 coincides with the discussion in Section 5.1. 
I fL > 1, then, by Theorem 4.6(i), v = kt for some integer t, and the message space 
can be partitioned into t subsets of size k, say M1, M2 . . . . .  Mr, such that, for any 
encoding rule e, 
e(S) = Mi 
for some i. Therefore let Ei denote the set of encoding rules mapping S onto M s and 
then El, E2 . . . .  , Et will form a partition of E. Moreover, by Theorem 4.6(ii), if 
el(S ) = ez(S), 
then 
p(el) = P(e2), 
and hence let p~ denote the probability p(e) for any e in E~. 
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It is then straightforward toestablish that each triple (S, M~, E~) forms an (L, 1)- 
transitive set of permutations. This means that the study of O(L)-secrecy schemes 
with 
b=(v/k)'k!/(k-L)! and v>k 
i~s contained within the study of such schemes with v = k, and therefore we do not 
consider them further. 
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